"This certainly is an epistemological and aesthetic challenge, but it is above all as a political challenge that the concept of a programmatic reality is difficult to digest. Here, it is about the question of freedom, of the emancipation of man from the intentions of other men. In politics, therefore, finalistic thought is the only appropriate thought. The challenge that a programmatic reality represents is the need to learn to think apolitically, if we want to preserve the concept of human freedom. This is a paradox. If we continue to think politically, finalistically, if we continue to seek for purposes behind the programs that govern us, we will fall fatal victims to this absurd programming, which precisely predicts just such attempts at “demythologizing” among its virtualities.
We can always better observe how different apparatus progressively program individual and social behavior. And we can observe, on top of this, the behavior of “intelligent instruments,” whose program we know and in which we recognize our own behavior. That is: we can always better observe how much the programmatic reality becomes progressively less “theoretical” and is increasingly applied within praxis. Certainly it is a case of deliberate application. There are programmers. However, despite this: if we persist with finalistic thought, if we continue to try to discover the programmers behind the programs, in order to demystify their intentions, we will lose sight of what is essential in the scene. Within the current scene all “Kulturkritik” is an anachronism. Because what is essential in the scene is the fact that programs, despite being projected by programmers, become autonomous. Apparatus always function increasingly independently from their programmer’s intentions. And apparatus that are programmed by other apparatus emerge with increasing frequency. Their initial purpose always recedes farther beyond the horizon, and becomes less interesting. Human programming is itself increasingly programmed by apparatus. Certainly: some specific programmers judge themselves, subjectively, to be “owners” of the decisions taken by apparatus. When, in reality, they are nothing but functionaries who are programmed to think of themselves in this way. “Kulturkritik” naively accepts the programmer’s naive and programmed view, and in so doing, itself becomes a function within programs. Apparatus incorporate both programmers and critics progressively. Freedom will die if we continue to think politically and to act according to such thinking.
We must neither anthropomorphize nor objectify apparatus. We must grasp them in their cretinous concreteness, in their programmed and absurd functionality, in order to be able to comprehend them and thus insert them into meta-programs. The paradox is that such meta-programs are equally absurd games. In sum: what we must learn is to accept the absurd, if we wish to emancipate ourselves from functionalism. Freedom is conceivable only as an absurd game with apparatus, as a game with programs. It is conceivable only after we have accepted politics and human existence in general to be an absurd game. Whether we continue to be “men” or become robots depends on how fast we learn to play: we can become players of the game or pieces in it."
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